Pagels differentiates between "third-person science" and "first-person science" in this final reflection. THIRD-PERSON SCIENCE is that which intends to show us the world's material order as we see it in professional journals and conferences. "Of course this science is 'culture-bound' (especially in the choice of subjects suitable for investigation) and is subject to the all-too-human failings of the scientistys who do it. Yet its intent, however imperfectly realized, is that this knowledge be true for all of us." (p. 362)
FIRST-PERSON SCIENCE, by contrast, cannot strive to be meaningful for all people, as does third-person science. It is "the personal thoughts of an individual interpreting and responding to the reality of the world discovered by [third-person] science." (p. 362) Every scientist does both types of science. Everyone is passionate about his personal experience of reality (first-person science); ironically, that passionate intensity can get in the way of the exploration of the world in the mode of third-person science.
Pagels gives vignettes of different human attitudes toward the material world: those of Homo sapiens (the follower of pure reason); Homo spiritualis (the celebrant of the cosmic consciousness or God--our favorite fellow, Teilhard de Chardin, he holds up as a prime example); Homo faber (the fabricator or maker--see Andrew Carnegie); Homo ludens (the player--see Richard Feynman). Pagels's sympathies lie with Homo ludens and Homo faber, who are open to novelty and unlimited by preconceived constructions.
[COMMENT: In this preference, Pagels stands with postmodernists like Richard Rorty. He does not deny that we "can have confidence in the provisional truth of scientific knowledge," ie., third-person science. (p. 370) However, he, like Rorty, cautions us to "distinguish carefully between scientific knowledge and those world views of reality which, although consistent with our scientific knowledge, represent extrapolations that go beyond it. There can be no universal certainty about the truth of any such world view, which is neither capable of, nor should have, a rational foundation." (p. 370)]