ARTIFACTS FROM THE HEGEL DIG:

A reading of Hegel's Preface becomes an archaeological search

for the shapes of modern consciousness

 

 

 

Index of Hegel pieces in rpr/WORKS

 

6 226 June 2000; last modified 12 February 2001 Copyright © 2001 Richard P. Richter

 


 

index

 

Index of Hegel pieces in rpr/WORKS:

Reading notes: ADVENTURES OF THE WORLD-SPIRIT RISING In The Philosophy of History, G. W. F. Hegel gave us one of modernity's grand narratives, and it is summarized here. (12 February 2001)

HEGELIAN OPPOSITIONS HELP EXPLAIN GLOBALIZATION. Fredric Jameson. "Notes on Globalization as a Philosophical Issue." Fredric Jameson and Masao Miyoshi, Eds. THE CULTURES OF GLOBALIZATION. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999, pp. 54-77. (19 November 2000)

ARTIFACTS FROM THE HEGEL DIG A reading of Hegel's Preface becomes an archaeological search for the shapes of modern consciousness. (26 June 2000)

I, MYSELF, ACCORDING TO HEGEL Alexandre Kojeve's lectures on Hegel are synopsized in the form of an imaginary telling to the folk around the fire. (19 February 2000) A quote from Kojeve keynotes rpr/WORKS.

And Hegel's ideas are at play also in the following:

DO INTERNAL DISUNITIES IMPERIL EMPIRES MODERN AS WELL AS ANCIENT? Michael Grant's revisit to Gibbon's great text makes one wonder about 1976 CE as well as 476 CE. (17 December 2000)

THE FINITE SPACE OF THE GLOBE HOLDS THE KEY TO THE HUMAN STORY The daring thought of the Jesuit paleontologist, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, converges with the postmodern theories of Fredric Jameson. (17 July 2000)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

work

 

THE WORK

Walter Kaufmann. Ed. and Trans. HEGEL: TEXTS AND COMMENTARY. Hegel's Preface to His System in a New Translation with Commentary on Facing Pages, and "Who Thinks Abstractly?" Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977. Copyright 1965.


This little book (132 pages) is the second part of Walter Kaufmann's Hegel: Reinterpretation, Texts, and Commentary. The other part not offered here is an intellectual biography and reinterpretation of Hegel's thought. The book at hand is simply the preface to The Phenomenology, with Kaufmann's facing-page commentary. Hegel first offered the work in 1807. Kaufmann's commentary takes the form of narrow editing and translating issues as well as some issues of substance and style.

The format won my approval, for it gave at least the feeling that an informed comrade was running a knowing finger along the paths of Hegel's original grand map of universal knowledge.


Contents

Preface for the Anchor Edition, ix

The Preface to the Phenomenology: Translation with Commentary on Facing Pages, 1

I. Philosophy must become scientific, 7

II. The idea of a phenomenology of the spirit, 29

III. Truth, 57

IV. Conclusion, 89

"Who Thinks Abstractly?" (Translation), 113

Index, 119

Acknowledgments, 131

 


 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

reflection

 

REFLECTION ON GROWING UP MODERN

Reading Hegel, like reading Kant, is like doing archaeology on the buried artifacts of one's own consciousness. At least that is the case for anyone whose mind took form before the modernist orthodoxy broke apart in the wake of the revolutionary 1960s. In particular, I find in this text the affirmation of several tenets of my formal education:

--the absolute truth is approachable through the exercise of the rational mind;

--the apprehension of truth by human society is progressive;

--history evolves; and therefore qualities of human life, such as freedom, can progress from less to more.

Tenets such as these were not drummed into me by rote. They were not even taught in any direct way. They were interwoven in the very substance of what I studied. Without assuming them, I would have been able to make no sense of the materials put in front of me for study. Professors did not expect me to argue the validity of such tenets. But they expected me to understand that our texts and the world that produced our texts would be incomprehensible if I did not view them as the products of such a vision.

For a random example, I landed on Matthew Arnold's speech at Eton, published in his Irish Essays of 1882. The speech purports to trace the changing uses of the Greek word for "flexibility" (eutrapelos, eutrapelia) through the centuries of classical history. Arnold manages to use the word as a thread that ties together the rise and fall of Dorian and Ionian culture and the rise of Christianity; and, as one might expect, he finishes with an application of his classical excursion to the moral imperatives of Victorian England. The moral for the Etonian audience is this:

that man has to make progress along diverse lines,

in obedience to a diversity of aspirations and powers,

the sum of which is truly his nature; and that he fails

and falls short until he learns to advance upon them all,

and to advance upon them harmoniously.

(Craig Hardin and J. M. Thomas. Eds. English Prose of the Nineteenth Century. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1929, p. 598.)

The Hegel-like refrain of historical dialectic in this bit of Arnoldiana could be found in countless texts from the authors of modernity.

But I did not think of such texts as expressive of a Hegelian vision. I knew that this was the vision of the world my generation inherited. The many voices of the literary canon, which we studied, conveyed it implicitly or explicitly. And, of course, it was not exclusively Hegelian anyway; it was the sum of what we now call cultural production on a host of fronts over the course of a couple of centuries. Institutionalized as liberal humanism in the American academy, it determined the mental architecture of the generations that we now can look back upon as "modern"--of which I must count myself a member.

I visited Hegel's text not only to see some of the lathes and joists behind the facade of that modern mental architecture. I also wanted to visit Hegel's thought for itself. There is a freshness in old texts that are read without the baggage of their history. It was Hegel's fate in general accounts of the history of ideas to become cast as the main influence in the work of his most famous student, Karl Marx. It was also his bad luck that--partly because of Marx's appropriation-- commentators transformed his essential idea of the dialectic of becoming into a cartoon formula, "thesis-antithesis-synthesis." Kaufmann reports the finding of a Hegel lexicographer that Hegel mentioned the formulaic terms together only once--and then disparagingly! (81). Yet "Hegel" has become almost synonymous with the formula.

It seems, then, a small salute in fairness to the master to seek an encounter with his thought head-on. He insisted on a new philosophical standard of intense concentration on the thought at hand: "Scientific knowledge...demands precisely that we surrender to the life of the object or--and this is the same thing--that we confront and express its inner necessity." (80) I heard that Hegelian call in the refrain of faculty over the years, implanting academic "rigor" in the curriculum and demanding that students "rigorously" pursue it.

 

 

 


 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

PIECES

PIECES OF HEGEL'S THOUGHT

I am limiting the rest of these notes to a few interesting points from my reading of the Preface. It would violate Hegel's own admonition if I were to try to provide a thorough summary of the Preface. Early on, indeed, his text condemns the fault of summarizing the aims of philosophy and thereby missing the life of its thought. A mere statement of the philosopher's aim "is a lifeless generality; the tendency is a mere drift which still lacks actuality; and the naked result is the corpse which has left the tendency behind." (10) Kaufmann's interesting comment on this passage is worth quoting in full:

Most English-speaking philosophers 150 years after this was written would agree with this paragraph. A student who remembers and reproduces the conclusions of his teacher, or of some great philosopher, but not the way in which things are worked out in detail, has only got hold of something lifeless: the spirit of philosophy has escaped him. What counts in philosophy is not the striking aim or claim, but the detail. (11)

The pieces of Hegel's thought that I note with interest are as follows:

 

(1) TRUTH PROGRESSES FROM SYSTEM TO SYSTEM

(2) HEGEL WRITES AGAINST THE TEMPER OF HIS TIMES

(3) TRUTH INVOLVES FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ACTION (28-39)

(4) THE INDIVIDUAL ASCENDS INTO THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SPIRIT THROUGH A LONG JOURNEY (42-54)

(5) SCIENCE ORGANIZES ITSELF THROUGH THE LIFE OF THE CONCEPT (80-96)

(6) A FINAL QUESTION: DO HEGEL AND TEILHARD CONVERGE?

 

 


 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(1) TRUTH PROGRESSES FROM SYSTEM TO SYSTEM

At the start, Hegel talks about the way he believes knowledge advances. He speaks against the simplistic notion that truth and falsity in philosophical systems are rigidly contradictory. Such a notion fails, he says, to "comprehend the difference of the philosophical systems in terms of the progressive development of the truth." (8) Here, according to Kaufmann's commentary, we have the germinal idea for the history of philosophy. In 1807 there was no such discipline. (9)

Hegel turns to the metaphor of a fruit plant to illustrate. One philosophical system is like a blossom. Another system comes along and displaces it the way the fruit displaces the blossom. The blossom and the fruit are incompatible, but that does not mean they are not related. "Their fluid nature...makes them...elements of an organic unity in which they not only do not conflict, but in which one is as necessary as the other; and it is only this equal necessity that constitutes the life of the whole." (8)

Hegel here is not, of course, arguing that all philosophical roads lead to a single Rome. He is simply declaring that the abbreviated statement of the aims of two systems might well appear to be in opposition; but such a superficial black-and-white contrast of summary points does nothing for the advance toward "knowledge itself." (8)

"Pieces of Hegel's Thought": Back to list || Forward to (2) Hegel writes against the temper of his times

 

 

 

 


 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(2) HEGEL WRITES AGAINST THE TEMPER OF HIS TIMES

Aided by Kaufmann's notes, we see how Hegel establishes the necessity that philosophy find truth only through the difficult comprehension of the Concept. Here again, the rigorous pursuit of truth is called for as an inner necessity (14). Hegel sets his science of knowledge over against the prevailing view. The prevailing view, as he sees it, is that philosophical comprehension should come directly through feeling and intuition. (14) Mere edification through religious or romantic enthusiasm (such as that found in the popular thinkers of the time) is Hegel's target here. He opposes this prevailing attitude toward philosophy because, in the end, he believes it hides the truth (18).

Hegel complements this "internal necessity" that philosophy become scientific, dedicated to comprehending the Concept, with a corresponding "external necessity." That external necessity he finds in the transitional conditions of philosophy at the time in which he wrote, precipitated by the French Revolution. He speaks against the formalism of current philosophers. He criticizes them for subjecting everything to an "absolute idea," leading them to a "formless repetition" that remains external to the material and therefore meaningless. (24)

I find it satisfying to know that Hegel advanced his philosophy in response to the intellectual temper of his times. The difficult procedure that he plans to elucidate for his science of the Concept softens into a human strategy designed to transform an historical situation.

"Pieces of Hegel's Thought": Back to list || Forward to (3) Truth involves form and substance in action (28-39)

 

 

 


 

 

 

 

(3) TRUTH INVOLVES FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ACTION (28-39)

Hegel here states his view that we "comprehend and express the true" (28) as "subject" (that is, form) just as much as "substance" (that is, matter or content). For Hegel, it seems that simple substance is insufficient. It has to be in motion. It is subject (form) that makes motion. He sees substance living only when it is in the process of "positing itself." (28) The subject of the substance--that is, its form--does this positing, as I understand it, creating the truth or essence of the substance.

I have to quote Hegel to pin this down as much as I can: "The true is its own becoming, the circle that presupposes its end as its aim and thus has it for its beginning--that which is actual only through its execution and end." (30) The keynote here is movement, motion, motive, action, predication. Simple substance simply is insufficient for Hegel. He posits a world that comes into being through action. Action drives the process by which the Concept--the science of truth according to Hegel--rises to human consciousness.

Later Hegel draws on a marvelous metaphor to capture this vision of truth in action. It is a "bacchanalian whirl." All the forms of consciousness are caught in a drunken coming to be and passing away--positive and negative, appearance and actuality. (70) Kaufmann tells us that this is one of the most famous passages in all of Hegel. According to Kaufmann, Hegel means to suggest with it the "passing stages of the spirit's Bildung" on its way to the Concept. (73)

The passage is as follows:

The true is thus the bacchanalian whirl in which no member is not drunken; and because each, as soon as it detaches itself, dissolves immediately--the whirl is just as much transparent and simple repose. In the court of justice of this movement, to be sure, the individual forms of the spirit endure no more than determinate thoughts do, yet they are just as much positive and necessary moments as they are negative and evanescent. (70)

Contemplate the extremes to which Hegel's thought--mediated by Marx and others--drove European civilization in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. A bacchanalian whirl indeed it was.

"Pieces of Hegel's Thought": Back to list || Forward to (4) The individual ascends into the phenomenology of the spirit through a long journey (42-54)

FRO

 


 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(4) THE INDIVIDUAL ASCENDS INTO THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SPIRIT THROUGH A LONG JOURNEY (42-54)

We hear Hegel in these pages talking about the "scientific" (in his special philosophical sense of the term) education (Bildung) of the individual. He casts the uneducated individual in relation to the general, "self-conscious" world spirit of humanity. As Kaufmann interprets for us, (45) Hegel holds that the individual must learn in abbreviated form the educational stages already experienced by the general spirit. But he demands that this must be far more than an exercise in "familiarization." It must differentiate thoughts so that it reveals "the strength and work of the understanding, which is the most astonishing and the greatest, or rather the absolute, power." (50)

Kaufmann makes clear that the general world spirit, according to Hegel, acquires self-consciousness only through thinking individuals, not through some supra-human mind. (47) The educated individual bears the absolute power and responsibility to reveal truth, that is, "to sublimate fixed, determinate thoughts and thus to actualize the general and infuse it with spirit." (52) (In this sentence, Hegel seems to foreshadow the "bacchanalian whirl" [70] that accompanies the movement to general understanding.) The self-consciousness of the general world spirit, which the individual is seeking to advance, emerges from his "pure thinking" (52). Pure thoughts "become Concepts and come to what they are in truth: self-movements, circles, that which is their substance, spiritual entities." (52)

Reading this, I feel drawn again into a familiar but now-deserted world, the intellectual world of my youth. The denizens of that world assumed with Hegel that they were creating a universal understanding, a world of the reason that rode on the wheels of their hard thinking. Although there already were fatal cracks in its superstructure, they--we--moved as if a general world spirit, the sum and substance of human understanding, existed. Moreover, such a spirit could blend not uncomfortably with other notions of universality, derived from Christianity and from the ancient classical civilization of the Mediterranean. And for those engaged it was a long journey to find that world, a lifetime of acquiring the state of the spirit. Then, in the purest of methods, they might advance it, develop the Concept further, with the results of their knowledge, hard-won after long labor of mind. We were in the living presence of the idea of progress, of movement toward some fulfillment in human affairs, of a destiny held in our own hands. In the intervening years, that idea has passed away, leaving a very different kind of ground for any who want to think optimistically about the future of their species.

"Pieces of Hegel's Thought": Back to list || Forward to (5) Science organizes itself through the life of the Concept (80-96)

 

 


 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(5) SCIENCE ORGANIZES ITSELF THROUGH THE LIFE OF THE CONCEPT (80-96)

Here, to me, is the hardest thought. Hegel attempts to indicate how science--that is,truth--may "organize itself only through the life of the Concept." On these pages Hegel sketches the famous thesis-antithesis-synthesis. But if you don't get it fully from this prefatory sketch--and I don't--Hegel does not expect you to. He promises to give it a proper exposition in the "speculative philosophy" of his still unwritten Logic. (86)

I think the best thing to do here is to quote Hegel's sketch of the process and not try to interpret too much. It is clear that the action-orientation noted above is essential. Substance and subject are in motion. It is also clear that the wholeness of thoughts and beings has to be at play for them to yield truth, that is, understanding, reality, the absolute, spirit. Hegel is dissatisfied with mere edification, mere external description, mere pointing to an essence without thinking how its content and form together in themselves make becoming. And so here is the passage:

The movement of beings is, first [on the one hand], to become something other and thus to become their own immanent content; secondly [on the other hand], they take back into themselves this unfolding or this existence of theirs, i.e., they make themselves into a mere moment and simplify themselves into determinateness. In the first movement negativity consists in the differentiation and positing of existence; in the return into oneself it is the becoming of determinate simplicity. In this way, the content does not receive its determinateness from another, like a label; instead it determines itself and assigns itself its place as a moment of the whole. (80)

Hegel wants being--or truth, which is the same thing--to come not from some extrinsic source but from within the substance as such in process. He insists that the movement toward determinate being comes not from an "alien power" but from itself. "For it is the thought that moves and differentiates itself, its own inwardness, the pure Concept. Thus reasonableness is a becoming, and as such becoming it is rationality." (84)

It is important to keep in mind that when Hegel talks of the thought, of becoming, of the substance, he is seeing all these modes as uncontradictory steps or stages leading to the Concept, which embraces the all in the most realistic (and, I guess, simultaneously, the most idealistic) manner.

Hegel consistently focuses on the final goal, the Concept, which emerges from hard thinking dialectically as reality, truth. I again quote Hegel to capture the dynamism of his insight: "The Concept is the object's own self which presents itself as its becoming; thus it is not a subject at rest that carries its attributes unmoved, but it is the Concept that moves itself and takes its determinations back into itself." (92)

And to provide the necessary motion of the Concept in its self-realization, the thinker must correctly relate subjects and predicates. This relationship is not to be shallow argumentation. It is to be a dialectical movement upon one another that produces reality. (96)

"Pieces of Hegel's Thought": Back to list || Forward to (6) A Final question: Do Hegel and Teilhard converge?

 

 


 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(6) A FINAL QUESTION: DO HEGEL AND TEILHARD CONVERGE?

Enough Hegel for now. The meal is so rich I have to stop. Let these notes round out with a twentieth-century connection. Hegel held that the Concept (Absolute) realized itself through the progress of rational human understanding, a form of self-knowledge that became the world spirit. More than a century later, Teilhard de Chardin wrote in The Phenomenon of Man of human realization through self-knowledge of a most radical kind. His idea was that the human consciousness would undergo a global convergence of self-understanding. He called the process noogenesis. The consciousness of humankind would form a noosphere, he said. It would be the final encirclement of the globe, layered atop the biosphere and the physical spheres beneath it. Omega, the end of history, the apotheosis of human development, the Second Coming, would then occur. Do I err when I glimpse the ghost of Hegel's Absolute in this twentieth century metanarrative?

In an essay on Teilhard and Fredric Jameson, I look further at the concept of the noosphere.

"Pieces of Hegel's Thought": Back to list

 

 

 


 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

list

 

PIECES OF HEGEL'S THOUGHT

(1) TRUTH PROGRESSES FROM SYSTEM TO SYSTEM

(2) HEGEL WRITES AGAINST THE TEMPER OF HIS TIMES

(3) TRUTH INVOLVES FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ACTION (28-39)

(4) THE INDIVIDUAL ASCENDS INTO THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SPIRIT THROUGH A LONG JOURNEY (42-54)

(5) SCIENCE ORGANIZES ITSELF THROUGH THE LIFE OF THE CONCEPT (80-96)

(6) A FINAL QUESTION: DO HEGEL AND TEILHARD CONVERGE?