hegelhistory

INTRODUCTION BY ROBERT S. HARTMAN (ix-xl)

I. The Significance of Hegel for History (ix-xxi)

Hartman, writing in 1953, offers us the view that Hegel's philosophy of history had a profound effect on virtually all political systems and ideologies, even those--such as Nazism and Communism--that opposed one another. (xi)

The dialectical form of his philosophy, Hartman says, rather than the content of his history, explains why it had such a broad influence. (xi)

The power of his system derived from the way Hegel caught the whole of thought and the world in its chain. (xii) It was, at the same time, independent of any concrete fact and totally immersed "in the concrete factuality of the world." (xii) To quote Hartman:

The power of the method lies in its inner dynamic and universal applicability. One thought, in an almost literal sense, "gives" the next--thesis leading to antithesis, and both to synthesis, the latter serving as new thesis...ad infinitum. (xii)

Hartman then mentions examples of 19th and 20th century events touched by Hegel's philosophy and how both the Left and the Right misunderstood it. (xiii) Many mistakenly thought Hegel saw the Prussian state as the culmination of history; he saw it as the highest development up to his time but not in an absolute sense. (xiv) Hegel's influence on Walt Whitman, prophet of American democracy, (xv) and on John Dewey, author of American pragmatism, counterbalanced his reputed authoritarian influence. (xvi)

Hartman then explains how Hegel's thought swept past Kantian philosophy to assert that history is the progress of the self-development of Spirit in the world. And, "since Spirit by its inner nature is free, History is the progress of Freedom." (xvii) Hegel thus had a more profound influence on romanticism than Kant (xviii). His influence on materialist thinking, through Marx, was even more far-reaching. (xix-xxi)

II. The Significance of History for Hegel (xxi-xl)

1. Idea and Spirit (xxi-xxv)

Hartman here attempts to summarize Hegel's sense of History as the interrelationship of Idea-Nature-Spirit. From this interrelationship comes Hegel's notion that History "is not the appearance [but] the reality of God." (xxi) The unfolding of knowledge of History yields knowledge of God, and this is a progressive and optimistic process (since God is good). (xxii)

Hartman introduces this section by saying that "History is the development of Spirit in Time" for Hegel. (xxi) By Time he means "the time of consciousness," during which Spirit "beats out the 'phases' of history" (xxii) in concrete events. Hartman elaborates by discussing the way Hegel's philosophy captures the tension between the universal and the particular, the individual and the eternal--always directed by the quality of Freedom. (xxiv-xxv)

2. Freedom (xxv-xxvi)

In these two pages, Hartman gives us a convenient and powerful summation of Hegel's association of Spirit (Freedom) with human knowledge. This is the heart and soul of the modern idea that "the content of knowledge...is the spiritual itself." (xxv) [Therein, I think, we see the justification for the professionalization of knowledge in the 19th century academy.]

World history is the progress of Freedom, because it is the progress of the self-consciousness of Spirit. (xxv)

Spirit is self-reflective; it does not find a content elsewhere but rather makes itself "into its own object, its own content." Hence its freedom. (xxv)

3. The National Spirit (xxvii-xxix)

For Hegel, universal Spirit was not an abstraction; it was a "concrete actuality" in the form of human individuals and collective peoples. They made up nation states, which were organizations of Freedom. Hartman explains how badly his readers misunderstood Hegel's notion of the state. (xxvii)

The state is essential to Hegel as an instrument of the progress of Spirit. One people in its state develops to a heightened consciousness of itself (as Spirit), then ceases to strive onward, leans back and enjoys its achievement, declines while reflecting on itself through philosophy and art. As this people dies off, its national and particular accomplishment of Spirit (toward making Freedom conscious of itself) "returns to its universality," which is thus enriched. Another people picks up this enriched universal Spirit in its own concrete experience and goes through the same process, adding its understanding to universal Spirit; and so on until the completion of civilization. Art, religion, and philosophy are created by finite states but transcend states in significance because they contain the absolute Idea--states are only phases of history. (xxix)

4. The Four Kinds of Men

Hartman says that Hegel placed individual man in a sphere beyond the state, but his interpreters neglected this. (xxx) He posited four types:

--The citizen: the individual who becomes conscious of his freedom is an instance of the universal of freedom, which is the state. (xxxi) Hartman examines numerous ways in which readers misinterpreted this Hegelian notion of the citizen in the state, to the point of caricature. (xxxii-xxxiv)

--The person: The person is the absolutely moral being, whereas the citizen is merely the relatively moral being functioning within the state. The person taps a "deeper recess of the human spirit which is beyond the state." This makes man "an end in himself." (xxxiv-xxxv)

--The hero: He stands between the citizen's relative, social morality and the absolute morality of the person. He combines the "uniquely individual" with the "universally social." His morality is "not that of the state but that of creating the state." (xxxvi) He is an impersonal conduit of Spirit as it develops. (xxxvii) He is the subject of history.

The victim: He is the object of history, the private person "who prefers happiness to greatness." (xxxviii) He lacks the historical insight of the hero and becomes history's victim. He isolates himself from the process of World Spirit but is nonetheless part of it. His tragedy is to be blind to what is happening to him in that process, though he may be "moral" in a small sense. (xxxix)

End of INTRODUCTION BY ROBERT S. HARTMAN. Select next section below.

REASON IN HISTORY: A GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY (Hartman) (3-95)

I. The Three Methods of Writing History (3-10)

Hegel begins by differentiating between "original history" (close-up accounts by historians of first-hand experience or that of contemporaries); "reflective history" (transcends the present as universal, pragmatic, critical, or fragmentary accounts of a people, country, or the world); "philosophical history." The latter is Hegel's medium. It combines the data of reality with philosophical ideas and makes for a "thoughtful contemplation of history." (10)

II. Reason as the Basis of History (11-19)

Hegel declares that his study of history has proved to him that Reason rules the world and therefore "in world history, things have come about rationally." (11)

Hegel then discusses the knowability of God as history through Reason. It is possible to know God as history; this obligates us to seek the understanding (of history) that is possible. (14-17)

He takes a swipe at the romantic conceit that we can know God as history through feeling alone. (17-18)

But to understand how Reason governs the world, we have to define it adequately--and Hegel proposes to do that in the next chapter. (18-19)

III. The Idea of History and Its Realization (20-67)

Hegel says he is dealing with nothing less than the question of "the ultimate purpose of the world." (20) "World" means physical and psychical nature and purpose involves both. But (psychical) Man comes after the creation of physical nature. His thought creates "the realm of Spirit," which includes everything of interest to man. Human nature is the point where (psychical) Spirit and (physical) Nature unite. The concept of human nature is universal and permanent, despite the finite individuality of humans who represent it. God, his will, the ultimate purpose of the world--all these are the same, and we call them "the Idea." (21) The Idea manifests itself as human spirit, a.k.a. the idea of freedom. (22) Spirit in its most concrete reality appears as world history. We have to understand the nature of Spirit to understand the concreteness of world history. Hegel says he will assert this in the pages to come. (22)

1. The Idea of Freedom (22-25)

Spirit is the opposite of Matter. Matter is essentially gravity; Spirit is essentially Freedom (from gravity). Spirit is thus self-contained, independent of anything else. Matter has its substance outside itself, dependent (on gravity). Spirit is thus independent, free "consciousness of self." (22-23) [Does the "idealism" attributed to Hegel come from this definition of Spirit as something unconnected to the real material world?]

Consciousness of self involves THAT one knows as well as WHAT one knows. Thus, Spirit knows; and what it knows is itself. So, "world history is the exhibition of spirit striving to attain knowledge of its own nature." (23) The actualization of Spirit's consciousness of its Freedom is "the final purpose of the world." (24) But Hegel says he has to explain in the next section how man realizes the ambiguous term "Freedom." (25)

2. The Means of Realization (25-49) [Particular human beings are the only means of realization, in the following three ways.]

(a) The idea and the individual (25-34): The concept of Spirit (a.k.a. principle, purpose, final destiny) is at first only "inner intentions." It can become completely real (actual) only when individual humans act in accordance with their will (passion). (28-9) As individuals act out their particular desires, they unconsciously begin the general realization of the idea of Spirit--they are "tools of a higher and broader purpose of which they [as yet] know nothing." (31) "The whole business of history...is to bring it [i.e., the idea of Spirit] into consciousness." (30) Thus, the individual as a uniquely private character is absolutely essential to the realization of the Idea. Hegel then summarizes the cardinal points of the dialectic by which the Ego--individual subject--becomes conscious of its particularity in relation to its opposition, the universal Idea. (32-34) [This is a succinct definition of the modern "depth" subject who while completely individual relates to a universal Idea.]

(b) The individual as subject of history (34-43): The universal Idea "must be actualized by the particular" actions of individuals; but the individuals are freely gratifying their own interests and need not be conscious of the universal aim that they are abetting. (35-36) The individuals' ordinary duty in civic and family life within the state is different from their effort to activate "the spirit of his people," which originates in the universal Idea, not in the ethical community of the state. (38) Hegel declares he is here describing the progress of the universal Spirit "to an ever higher concept of itself." (39) It occurs when the state--to which individuals contribute their ethical efforts--declines. But it contributes its accomplishment, as it dies, to the universal development. "Historical men, world-historical individuals" (a.k.a. "heroes") grasp the higher universal at the moment of collision of old and new; they see what is needed at the right time and take the needed action (Caesar is Hegel's example). (39-40) Heroes do not pursue "happiness"; rather, they act "passionately" for the universal need and get their fulfillment that way. (41) Heroes are the subjects of history and transcend mere dutiful citizens who stay within the existing civic law.

(c) The individual as object of history (43-49): The "cunning of Reason" is that it uses the passionate nature of particular individuals to work toward its universal ends. (44) Individuals, though transient instruments or means of Reason, are also ends in themselves because the content of their morality, ethics, and religion rests in Reason, that is, freedom. (44-45) Hegel reviews the many limitations and problems of humans when they contemplate ideals (45-47); but none of that stops philosophers from striving to comprehend the plan of God, a.k.a., "universal divine Reason," in its concrete actuality. All human individuals have an "inner focus" on the essence of the religious, which is the claim of "subjective freedom." (48) Summarizing this whole section, Hegel says the World Spirit actualizes its concept through "the activity of the subjects in whom Reason is present as their substantial essence in itself, but still obscure and concealed from them." (48)

3. The State (49-67)

(a) The state as realization of the idea (49-53): Hegel identifies the end attained by the above means as the essential being, "the union of the subjective with the rational will." This is "the moral whole" or "the State." (49) Importantly, he emphasizes that the caprice of the individual is not freedom; rather, human freedom lives in the law, morality, the State itself. (50) "The universal Idea manifests itself in the State" as an actuality. (51) By State Hegel means a people as a "spiritual individual" rather than a mere political entity. (52) This is the opposite of a social contract: "the state does not exist for the citizens; on the contrary, one could say that the state is the end and they are its means." (52) World history thus has as its object the State, for it is the "realization of Freedom." (52-53)

(b) Law as realization of freedom (53-56): Hegel rejects Rousseauian primal freedom of man in a state of nature. Freedom requires law and morality. (55) "[S]ociety and the state are the very conditions in which freedom is realized." (55) The state as a family--patriarchy--also theorizes that law is unnecessary for freedom; but Hegel sees the resulting theocracy as incapable of separating the family from civil society. (56)

(c) The legal foundation of the state (The constitution) (56-62): Hegel discusses the many contingencies that attend the formation of constitutions in states. (56-60) The form of a constitution depends on the stage of a people's spiritual development. (60-61) It is peculiar to a people and has no "universally valid basis." On the other hand, the science and art of a people have an essential connection with the universal. (61) Thus, the State is "the moral whole and the reality of freedom" (62) but it is "essentially the medium of historical change, and the stages of the Idea represent in it various principles." (61)

(d) The religious foundation of the state (62-67): The concrete reality of the State is "the spirit of the people", which embraces their whole existence, including morality and religion. Religion is a people's truth as they live in their State. It thus "stands in closest connection with the principle of the State." (64) The State thus is "based on religion." (64)

IV. THE COURSE OF WORLD HISTORY (68-95)

1. The principle of development (68-71): Unlike natural organisms, Spirit develops from potentiality into actuality (dialectically) through consciousness and will. (69) But "Spirit is at war with itself" as it seeks to attain its own concept. (69) Hence historical development is hard struggle. Hegel identifies the three stages of world history: (a) immersion of Spirit in natural life; (b) partial consciousness of freedom; (c) pure universality of freedom, "where the spiritual essence attains the consciousness and feeling of itself." (71) He alludes to the dialectical formation of each stage, wherein the preceding stage contains the next stage within itself as its own opposite. (71)

2. The origin of history (71-78)

(a) The pre-history of Reason (71-75): Hegel rejects the notion of a "primary, paradisical state of man" in which man had direct knowledge of God. All history must start with the rise of conscious awareness of self. Nothing before that is in his plan.

(b) The state as condition of history (75-77): History requires both events (objective) and narration of those events (subjective). The State provides the medium for this dual requirement. Its rules and laws need "duration by remembrance." The State must be conscious of its past. (76)

(c) The historical role of language (77-78): The elaborate forms of language in pre-history do not open a window to history. It is only when early languages come in contact with the formation of states that they give evidence of Reason and hold interest for Hegel's kind of history. (78)

3. The course of development (78-95)

(a) The principle of a people (78-87): Tracing the course of world history involves empirically examining the particular principles of a people in a state ("the spirits of peoples"). World history does not involve "the private virtues of modesty, humility, love, and charity," which individuals practice. (83) It deals, rather, with the whole spirit of peoples as they rise and decline in the form of a State. The historian reflects on the universal concepts in a people such as "Genius, Talent, Art, Science." (84)

(b) The dialectic of national principles (87-95): As historical change occurs through time, Spirit elaborates on itself through the action of peoples. Peoples rise through tension between their potentiality and their actuality. When they are actualized in the State, they lose tension and decline and die a natural death. (90-91) But a national spirit has a universality that survives the death of the state itself. Spirit thinks itself; this "abolishes the actuality, the subsistence of what it is" but thereby it gains "the essence, the Thought, the universal of that which it only was (of its transient condition). Its principle is no longer this immediate content and purpose of what it previously was, but the essence of it." (94) Hegel ends the Introduction with the notion that, though history deals with Spirit through time, it is ever present and immortal: "The moments which Spirit seems to have left behind, it still possesses in the depth of its present." (95)

End of REASON IN HISTORY: A GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY (Hartman). Select next section below.

GEOGRAPHICAL BASIS OF HISTORY

[From the Sibree translation, pp.79-102. In Sibree, this constitutes the final section of the Introduction. Hartman omits it.]

The natural setting for the spirit of a people is extrinsic but necessary as a basis for its development. (79) Different climates set different possibilities, and the temperate climate is "the true theatre of History" where Freedom is most likely to arise. (80)

The native Americans were inferior and unprepared to receive the spirit of history from Europeans and justifiably died off [what a bias!] (81-2) Africans were "more susceptible of European culture than the Indians." (82) S. America, Catholic, is poorly developed toward the world-spirit of freedom; N. America, Protestant, is advanced. (84) North America and Europe cannot be compared, because westward migration takes pressure off in the US. (86)

In the end, philosophical history does not deal with America, for it is all about the future, "where...the burden of the World's History shall reveal itself....[It is] a land of desire" for old Europe. (86) However, philosophical history deals not with the future but with the past and the present, so Hegel dismisses the New World from his account. (87)

After discussing three differences in Old World geography (arid elevated land, valley plains, and coast regions), Hegel then considers the three portions of the globe he is concerned with--Africa with its upland feature, Asia with its contrasting rivers and uplands, and Europe with its mingling of all the geographical elements. (88-91) He makes some Conrad-like statements about the darkness and primitiveness of Africa. (91-99) Along with America, he leaves Africa out of his account because its people are so immature and unprepared for Freedom. (99)

That leaves him Asia and Europe in which to trace the development of the World-Spirit. Hegel establishes Asia as the Oriental quarter of the globe, the "region of origination." (99) "...as Europe presents on the whole, the centre and end of the old world, and is absolutely the West--so Asia is absolutely the East." (99) Asia was the site where "the Light of Spirit" arose (99) and moved to the West from there.

This section ends with a geographical partitioning of both Asia and Europe, preliminary steps for the philosophy of history to follow in the succeeding chapters.

End of GEOGRAPHICAL BASIS OF HISTORY. Select next section below.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY (Sibree)

CLASSIFICATION OF HISTORIC DATA (Sibree, pp. 103-110)

Hegel offers us a grand metaphor for the whole course of history from the East/Orient, where the Sun--the Light of Freedom--first arose exterior to the inner man. Then, by that exterior light man illuminated his own inner understanding of the Light/Sun. This understanding was higher than the external Sun, for man was now consciously related to Spirit, freedom. (103)

Here is Hegel's famous summation of course of history from East to West:

"The History of the World is the discipline of the uncontrolled natural will, bringing it into obedience to a Universal principle and conferring subjective freedom.

"The East knew and to the present day knows only that One is free;

"the Greek and Roman world, that some are free;

"the German World knows that All are free.

"The first political form therefore which we observe in History, is Despotism, the second Democracy and Aristocracy, the third Monarchy." (104)

Hegel applies to this development the metaphor of human growth from childhood (East/Orient); to adolescence (ancient Greece); to manhood (the Roman State, which is "the realm of abstract Universality (in which the Social aim absorbs all individual aims)"; to old age (the German world, whose nature is weak but whose spirit "is its perfect maturity and strength, in which it returns to unity with itself...as Spirit.") (105-109)

Hegel concludes his discussion of categories by mapping the progress of Spirit in the German world through the dialectical interaction of the early Christian Ecclesiastical State with the Secular State over the centuries. Through their dialectical relationship, the Spiritual finally "becomes reconnected with the Secular, and develops this latter as an independently organic existence." (109) [Hence, modernism.]

The specific and concrete details of this grand scheme of philosophical world history make up the four parts of the remainder of the book: Part I, The Oriental World; Part II, The Greek World; Part III, The Roman World; Part IV, The German World. Hegel defines the spirit of each world in accordance with his metaphor of human growth and examines illustrative events from each. The "modern time" is the last chapter of the German World. He sums up the culmination of Spirit's rise to human consciousness in the Protestant secular State of Europe in the following sentence: "In the Protestant world there is no sacred, no religious conscience in a state of separation from, or perhaps even hostility to Secular Right." (456) [Here we see the essence of the conservative appeal of Hegel's world-view as well as the kernel of its liberalism, which appealed to a different school.]

End of THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY (Sibree). End of Reading Notes.